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Lewis: Evidence - Privilege against Adverse Spousal Testimony - A Testif
[Vol. 28: p. 820
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE AGAINST ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY-A
TESTIFYING SPOUSE MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST ADVERSE
SPOUSAL TESTIMONY IN A GRAND JURY PROCEEDING EVEN THOUGH
THE GOVERNMENT HAS PROMISED THAT THE NONTESTIFYING SPOUSE
WILL NOT BE INDICTED BY THAT PARTICULAR GRAND JURY IF THE
NONTESTIFYING SPOUSE IS A TARGET OF THE UNDERLYING
INVESTIGATION

In re GrandJury Matter (1982)
A witness pleaded guilty to charges relating to involvement in an illegal
drug operation' and was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury 2 investigating the drug operation in which she had participated. 3 Although the witness was immunized against personal criminal liability stemming from her
testimony, 4 she refused to testify concerning the involvement of other parties
in the drug operation on the basis of the privilege against adverse spousal
testimony. 5 The Government admitted that while the witness' testimony was
sought in relation to the activities of third parties, the witness' husband was
a target of its investigation. 6 The Government further conceded that the
witness' testimony could indirectly have a bearing on the husband's indict7
ment in a subsequent proceeding.
The Government filed a motion to compel the witness' testimony and in
support of such motion agreed to preclude the possibility that the specific
grand jury before which the witness was asked to testify might indict her
1. In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 689 (3d Cir. 1982). The witness
pleaded guilty to "one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute methamphetamine, a non-narcotic controlled substance, and one count of
aiding and abetting the distribution of methamphetamine." Id.
2. The record in this case was ordered sealed and therefore, the names of the
interested parties were not disclosed. Id. at n.1.
3. Id. at 689.
4. Id. at 689 & n.4. The witness was immunized under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
Id. This section authorizes a United States Attorney to grant use and derivative-use
immunity to an individual who refuses to testify before a court or grand jury proceeding on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination. The individual may
then be compelled to testify because such testimony cannot be used against the witness, either directly or indirectly, in any criminal proceeding. Id. at 689-90 n.4. For a
discussion of use and derivative-use immunity, see note 36 and accompanying text

1?fra.
The privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional privilege. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V. That amendment states that "[n]o person. . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
5. 673 F.2d at 689-90. The privilege against adverse spousal testimony is a common law, not a constitutional, privilege. See notes 12-28 and accompanying text infra.
6. 673 F.2d at 690.
7. Id.

(820)
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spouse. 8 However, the Government did not conceal the fact that a separate
grand jury would be empaneled before which the United States would seek
the husband's indictment in the event that the witness' testimony implicated
a third party, and that person was willing to testify against the witness' husband. 9 The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied
the Government's motion to compel her testimony and held that the indirect
use of the witness' testimony contemplated by the Government would violate the witness' privilege.' 0 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit I I affirmed the order of the district court, holding that
[W]hen . . . the Government openly seeks one spouse's testimony

concerning the activity of a third party, who is alleged to have engaged in a common criminal scheme with a husband and his wife,
and the Government thereby hopes also to reach the nonwitness
spouse, the testimony sought is sufficiently adverse to the interests
of the absent spouse to permit the invocation of the privilege
against adverse spousal testimony.
8. Id. Initially, the Government filed an affidavit with the district court certifying that "nothing said by the witness before the grand jury would be used, 'either
directly or itdirectly, against her husband in any legal proceedings.' " Id. In effect, the
Government appeared to be promising to confer use and derivative-use immunity on
the nontestifying spouse, coextensive with that granted to the witness, as a method of
respecting the witness' privilege against adverse spousal testimony while still securing
the desired testimony which could be used against other members of the drug operation. Id.
However, in a subsequent affidavit, the Government attempted to narrow the
scope of the immunity offered to the witness' husband by promising only to refrain
from naming the witness' husband in an indictment presented to the specific grand
jury before which the witness' testimony was sought. Id.
9. Id. In effect, the Government severed the husband's indictment from that of
the other defendants in an attempt to respect the witness' privilege against adverse
spousal testimony by ensuring that the grand jury before which the witness was
sought to testify could not use the witness' testimony against her husband. Id. at 692.
The Third Circuit had previously suggested by implication that such a procedural
safeguard might adequately respect the privilege. See In re Grand Jury (Malfitano),
633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Mafiltano, see notes 44-49 and
accompanying text infra.
10. In re Grand Jury Matter, No. 80-121-4, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13,
1981), aft'd, 673 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982). The district court based its decision on the
Third Circuit's analysis in a prior case. See In re Grand Jury (Malfitano), 633 F.2d
276 (3d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Ma(/itano, see notes 44-49 and accompanying
text infra. The district court noted that
[t]he only difference that exists in the present case from the Mafitano
decision is that the testimony of the wife here will not directly implicate her
husband before the same grand jury before which she is testifying. Rather,
it will indirectly implicate her husband in a future legal proceeding. As
such, the effect is the same; the danger to the marital relationship is as
manifest.
In re Grand Jury Matter, No. 80-121-4, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1981).
11. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Sloviter, and Rosenn. Judge Rosenn
wrote the opinion in which Judge Sloviter concurred except for footnote 12. Judge
Adams wrote a dissenting opinion.
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In re Grandjury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 692 (3d Cir. 1982).
At common law husbands and wives were disqualified from testifying
either for or against one another.1 2 Although the common law disqualification of the husband or wife to testify as a witnessfor the party-spouse may be
of some historical relevance, 13 it is entirely distinct from the privilege not to
14
testify agaznst one's wife or husband.
While the historical reason for the birth of the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony is not entirely clear, 15 the modern justification for recog12. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66, at 144 (2d
ed. 1972). Such disqualification has ancient roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Lord Coke wrote in 1628 that "it hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife
cannot be produced either against or for her husband, [for they are two souls in one
flesh] .... ." E.

COKE,

A

COMMENTARIE

UPON LITrLETON

6b (1628). See also

Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958), overruledon othergrounds, Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)("The common-law rule, accepted at an early date
as controlling in this country, was that husband and wife were incompetent as witnesses for or against each other.").
13. Regardless of whether the common law spousal disqualification and the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony stem from the same source, it is clear that
the viability of the disqualification as a matter of federal law is well settled today.
The Supreme Court rejected the common law rule excluding testimony by spouses
for each other in 1933. See Funk v.United States, 290 U.S. 371, 386 (1933). The Funk
Court recognized that spousal disqualification was based on the practice of disqualifying witnesses with a personal interest in the outcome of a case. Id. at 376. However, the modern trend had become to admit "interested" testimony and to allow the

jury.to assess its credibility. Id. at 380. With the erosion of the underlying rationale
for spousal disqualification, the Funk Court saw no merit in its continued recognition.

d. at 386.
14. See 8 J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227, at 211 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Speaking of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony, Wigmore states that it is
odd that the privilege "comes into sight about the same time as the disqualification of
husband and wife to testify on one another's behalf. . . , for the two have no necessary connection in principle, and yet they travel together, associated in judicial
phrasing, from almost the beginning of their recorded journey." Id.
This spousal disqualification is said to result from two canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify on his own
behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the rule that a husband and

wife were considered as one entity and because the wife had no recognized separate
legal existence, the husband was that entity. Given these two rules, it logically followed that whatever statements were inadmissable for the husband were equally inadmissable for his wife. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony should be distinguished from

the privilege which protects private marital communications. Both privileges are
sometimes referred to as the "marital privilege." Critics of the privilege against adpriviverse spousal testimony remind that "[i]t is essential to remember that the ...
lege is not needed to protect information privately disclosed between husband and

wife in the confidence of the marital relationship." Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51 (1980). Such confidential communications are privileged under an independent rule protecting confidential marital communications. See Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
15. Wigmore states that, "[p]ossibly the true explanation is, after all, the simplest one, namely that a natural and strong repugnance was felt . . . to condemning
a man by admitting to the witness stand against him those who lived under his roof
.J.
WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2227, at 212. Others believe that the privilege
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nizing the vitality of the common law privilege in the federal courts has been
clearly defined by the Supreme Court to be "its perceived role in fostering
16
the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship."'
Professor Wigmore notes that "if the fear of causing marital dissension
or disturbing the domestic peace were genuinely the ground of the privilege
S. . , then the privilege should apply to testimony which in any way disparages or disfavors the other spouse, irrespective of his being a party to the
cause."' 7 However, such a broad application of the privilege was rejected at
common law and its scope was restricted to only such testimony as is adverse
to the other spouse's legal interests in the very case in which the testimony is
to be offered.' 8 This limitation on the scope of the privilege is continued and
19
well established in the federal courts.
Although the advisability of recognizing the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony has been seriously questioned in the modern era,20 the
privilege continues to have viability. 2 1 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part that "the privilege of a witness . . . shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 22 The
arose from common law rules of evidence now long extinct. See Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (overruled on other grounds,
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)). See generally J. WIGMORE, supra note
14, at § 2228, at 214-18 (list of the various justifications which have been forwarded
in support of the privilege); Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Obserattons on the Law of
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929).
16. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980). For a discussion of Trammel, see notes 23 & 27-28 and accompanying text infia. The Court has previously
examined the privilege against adverse spousal testimony and found it to be "necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but
for the benefit of the public as well." Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77
(1958), overruled on other grounds , Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
17. J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2234, at 230-31.
18. See generally J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2234, at 230-32. Professor Wigmore, who disfavored any recognition of the privilege against spousal testimony,
noted that "[i]t is not to be regretted that . . . the privilege was wholesomely kept
within some sort of bounds." See id. at 231.
has been
19. See In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974) ("the rule ...
limited to testimony which 'disfavors the other spouse's legal interests in the veg,case in
which the testimony is offered' ") (quoting J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2234 at
231); United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The privilege
applies only when the testimony of one spouse would favor or disfavor 'the other
spouse's legal interests in the very case in which the testimony is offered.' "); United
States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973)
(testimony of spouse of one defendant sought by co-defendant; proper procedure is to
grant severance and then permit the witness to testify for the co-defendant).
20. For a discussion of the criticisms of the privilege, see note 30 and accompanying text infra.
21. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
22. FED. R. EvID. 501. Thus, "[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge the
authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary developmpent of testimoTrammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
nial privileges in federal criminal trials .......
40, 47 (1980). The purpose of Rule 501 is to " 'provide the courts with the flexibility
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Supreme Court has recently interpreted the scope of the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony in Trammel v. United Slates,23 and modified the rule
of Hawkins v. United States. 24 In Hawkins, the Court found that the modern
rationale for the privilege justified its continued recognition in the federal
courts 25 and held that a nonwitness-spouse could invoke the privilege to prevent the witness-spouse from testifying against him. 26 In Trammel, the Court
modified the Hawkins rule "so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to
refuse to testify adversely" 27 but continued to view the privilege against adto develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,' and to leave the door open to
change." Id. at 47 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence generally do not apply to proceedings
before grand juries, an exception is made with respect to privileges. FED. R. EVID.
1101(d)(2). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (grand jury
may not violate a valid privilege).
23. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). In Trammel, the defendant-husband and two others were
indicted for importing heroin into the United States. Id. at 42. The defendant's wife
was named in the indictment as an unindicted co-conspirator. Id. The wife agreed
to cooperate with the Government. Id. When the defendant-husband discovered
that the Government intended to call his wife as an adverse witness, he moved to
sever his case from that of the other defendants and asserted his claim to a privilege
to prevent her from testifying against him. Id. The defendant-husband's motion to
sever was denied by the district court, his wife was allowed to testify, and he was
convicted on the basis of her testimony. Id. at 43. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court on the theory that the defendant's privilege against adverse spousal
testimony was violated. Id.
24. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). In Hawkins, the defendant was convicted in federal district court of illegally transporting a girl from Arkansas to Oklahoma for immoral
purposes. Id. at 74. The district court had permitted the Government, over the defendant's objection, to use his wife as a witness against him. Id. at 74-75. The case
was appealed to the Supreme Court on the theory that the defendant's privilege
against adverse spousal testimony was violated. Id.
25. Id. at 77-79. The Hawkins Court viewed the privilege as necessary to "foster
peace." Id. at 77. The Court did not think that family harmony would be less disturbed by voluntagy adverse spousal testimony than it would be by compelled adverse
spousal testimony. Id. To the contrary, the Court thought bitterness would be more
likely to arise in the instance of voluntary adverse spousal testimony. Id. Thus, to
promote marital harmony, the acknowledged rationale for the privilege, the Court
thought it proper to allow the nonwitness-spouse to invoke the privilege in order to
avoid a unreconcileable difference between a married couple. Id. at 78-79.
26. Id. at 79. "Hawkins, then, left the federal privilege for adverse spousal testimony where it found it, continuing 'a rule which bars the testimony of one spouse
against the other unless both consent.' " Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46
(quoting Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 78). However, the Hawkins Court
made it clear that its decision was not meant to "foreclose whatever changes in the
rule may eventually be dictated by 'reason and experience.' " 358 U.S. at 79.
27. 445 U.S. at 53. The Court, in justifying its modification of the Hawkns rule,
noted that
[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in
disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the
privilege to preserve. In these circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits
an accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to
frustrate justice than to foster family peace.
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verse spousal testimony as a viable principle of federal law. 28
Although the privilege against adverse spousal testimony remains a
30
29
principle of federal law it has been subjected to considerable criticism.
Id. at 52.

This justification seems logical on its face but has received criticism. See Haney,
The Evoluttwnaty Development of Marital Privileges in Federal Criminal Trials, 6 NAT'L J.
CRIM. DEF. 99, 155-56 (1980). It has been observed that

[bly propounding that adverse spousal testimony given for any reason is
evidence that the marriage is in disrepair, the Court either overlooks, ignores, or rejects the obvious possibility that sometimes a testifying spouse
may merely be selecting between such competing pressures as having to go
to prison or testifying against a loved one. And. . . the Government or the
trial judge may have purposely placed the witness in this predicament.
Id. at 156.
28. 445 U.S. at 53. The Court did not abandon the privilege but merely modified it in order to further "the important public interest in marital harmony without
unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs." Id.
29. At least seventeen states have abolished the privilege altogether in criminal
cases. See id. at 48 n.9. This may be viewed as particularly significant since the
Supreme Court has recognized that "the law of marriage and domestic relations are
concerns traditionally reserved to the states." Id. at 50 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
30. See generally J. BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 340
(1827); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 66; J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2228;
Brosman, Edward Livingston and Spousal Testimony in Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REV. 243,

265 (1937); Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 15, at 686; Reutlinger, Pohcy, Privacy and
Prerogatives.- A CriticalExamination of the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence as They Aj ect
MaritalPrivilege,61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1386-93 (1973).

Professor Wigmore has termed the privilege "the merest anachronism in legal
theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice." J. WIGMORE, supra note
14, § 2228, at 221. McCormick states that the "privilege is an archaic survival of a
mystical religious dogma and of a way of thinking about the marital relationship that
is today outmoded." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 66, at 145-46.
One commentator has capsulized the major criticisms of the privilege into the
following sentence:
In general, the thrust of these criticisms is that (a) the [marital] "dissension" caused by adverse testimony is minimal or nonexistent; (b) the "repugnance" at spousal condemnation is "mere sentiment" unworthy of
judicial recognition; and (c) whatever the validity of (a) and (b), neither
policy is sufficiently important to justify interference with the fact-finding
process.
Ruetlinger, supra, at 1386. Another commentator suggests that by deferring to the
privilege, "[t]he courts, in some cases at least, are sacrificing justice to a questionable
and, by this means, unenforceable ideal." Hutchins, supra, at 686.
The modern justification of the privilege, i.e., the notion that it fosters marital
harmony, has been seriously questioned on an empirical basis. See Rosenberg, The
New Looks in Law, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 539, 541-42 (1969). The privilege has been said
to be "based upon a supposititious impact of such testimony upon that interspousal
relationship in the future, which impact has no support in any behavioral science
evidence." In re Grand Jury (Malfitano), 633 F.2d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons,
J., concurring). In Hawkins, Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, hinted that the
majority of the Court may be "indulg[ing] in mere assumptions, perhaps naive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient rule to the interests of domestic tranquility." 358 U.S. at 81-82 (Stewart, J., concurring).
In addition, the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the
American Bar Association called for the abolition of the privilege against adverse

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/17

6

Lewis: Evidence - Privilege against Adverse Spousal Testimony - A Testif
826

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 820

Trammel Court, 3 ' but the Court, while rerefused to abolish it, finding that "the privilege

This criticism was noted by the
stricting the privilege,

32

against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important interests
to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of crimi33
nal justice."
It has never been suggested, even where the privilege against adverse
34
One excepspousal testimony is recognized, that it is an absolute privilege.
the
witness-spouse's
right
to
invoke
the
privilege
is
made
where either
tion to
"transactional ' 3 5 or "use and derivative-use" 36 immunity is granted to the

nonwitness-spouse. 3 7 Once the nonwitness spouse is granted immunity from
spousal testimony. 63 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS 594-95 (1938). The
American Law Institute, in its 1942 Model Code of Evidence, expressly rejected "a
privilege either in the witness-spouse to refuse to testify or in the party-spouse to
prevent the other from testifying." See MODEL CODE OF EvID. Rule 215 comment a
(1942). Similarly, in 1953 the Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, "abolish[ed] the rule . . .of
not requiring one spouse to testify against the other in a criminal action." See UNIF.
R. EvID. 23(2) and comment (1953).
31. See 445 U.S. at 44-45. Even courts which recognize the Trammel privilege
frequently seem reluctant to do so. See In re Grand Jury (Malfitano), 633 F.2d 276
(3d Cir. 1980). In Mafitano, the Third Circuit recognized the Trammel privilege but
evidently felt compelled to state that "we realize the possibility that the social benefit
of the privilege may be minimal and that it could be dispensed with without serious
erosion of marriages." Id. at 280.
32. See 445 U.S. at 50. The Trammel Court stated that the privilege "must be
strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth.' " Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-710 (1974).
It has been suggested that the Court has a "historical antipathy" for privileges in
the federal courts. See Haney, supra note 27, at 157. The factual context of Trammel
has been viewed as an opportunity which the Court seized to constrict the applicability of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony in federal courts. Id. at 157-58.
33. 445 U.S. at 51, 53.
34. See In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1974); J. WIGMORE, supra
note 14, § 2227, at 213-14. Wigmore states that even at the time of Coke's reference
to the privilege in 1628, "it was already well understood to be subject to some exceptions in criminal cases." Id. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 526
(1960). The decision in Wyatt recognized an exception to the privilege against adverse spousal testimony for cases in which one spouse commits a crime against the
other. Id. The exception has been expanded since Wyatt to include crimes against
the spouse's property. See, e.g., Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir.
1955). More recently, the exception has been further expanded to include crimes
against children of either spouse. See, e.g., United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362,
1367 (8th Cir. 1975).
35. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972). The Supreme Court
has defined transactional immunity to be "immunity from prosecution for offenses to
which compelled testimony relates." Id.
36. See id. The Supreme Court has defined use and derivative-use immunity
[sometimes called "use-fruits" immunity] to be "immunity from the use of compelled
testimony and evidence derived therefrom." Id.
37. See In re Grand Jury (Malfitano), 633 F.2d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons,
J., concurring). Judge Gibbons noted that "the court has . . . inherent power to
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prosecution, his spouse's testimony is in no meaningful way adverse to him
and thus the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is unnecessary. 38
Such a procedure was utilized in In re Snoonian3 9 where the Government
40
sought to have the witness-husband held in contempt for refusing to testify.
The purported danger to the wife arose solely because she had executed a
joint tax return and because her husband's testimony might lead to a charge
of fraud. 4 1 In response to the witness-husband's claim of privilege against
adverse spousal testimony, the Government had filed an affidavit with the
district court which in effect secured use and derivative-use immunity for the
nonwitness-wife. 42 The Snoontan court held that "the speculative nature of
the threat to the wife, coupled with the Government's unequivocal and convincing promises not to use any of the testimony against her, nullifies any
'43
claim of privilege as grounds for [the husband's] refusal to testify."
confer use-fruits immunity in order to obtain testimony which by virtue of the assertion of the marital testimonial privilege would be otherwise unavailable." Id.
38. See 445 U.S. at 50. The Trammel Court explictly stated that the privilege
must be strictly construed and allowed only to the very limited extent that the public
good (the promotion of marital harmony) transcends the need for probative evidence. Id. Without the danger of prosecution stemming from the testimony, the
danger of serious marital discord is removed and there is no public good to transcend
the need for probative evidence.
39. 502 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1974). In Snoonian, a husband testifying before a
grand jury investigating extortionate extensions of credit attempted to assert the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. Id. at I11.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 111-12. The affidavit stated: "On behalf of the United States Government, I hereby represent and agree that no testimony of Gary Snoonian [the witnessspouse] before the Grand Jury, or its fruits, will be used in any way in any proceeding
against his wife." Id. at 112. The Snoonian court acknowledged the effectiveness of
such a grant of immunity by noting that "[w]ere the Government to renege on its
sworn promise, it is hard to conceive of a court failing to find an estoppel." Id.
43. Id. at 113. The Snoonian court noted that the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony has been limited to testimony which "disfavors the other spouse's
legal interests in the very case in which the testimony is offered." Id. at 112 (citing J.
WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2234, at 231 (emphasis in original)). The court acknowledged that "[a]lthough no one is meaningfully a 'party' in a grand jury proceeding,
the privilege still applies." 502 F.2d at 112 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 346 (1974); In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974)). In light of the
Government's promise not to use anything said by the husband, or any fruits thereof,
against the wife, the Snooman court concluded that "this effectively removes the wife
from any category which can remotely be likened to a 'party' to the grand jury proceedings." 502 F.2d at 112.
It should be noted that Snoontan was decided several years before Trammel. See
notes 23 & 39supra. In the context of discussing the effects of the Trammel decision, at
least one commentator has stated that
the modified privilege developed in Trammel is still supported by the rationale of promoting domestic harmony. Whenever a case is presented to the
Court in which it is called upon to decide an issue pertaining to the new
modified Hawkins privilege, it will probably only allow this exclusionary
device to prevail in cases where it clearly furthers this policy. Even where
some justification for it can be advanced, the Court will likely require it to
meet the test which the Hawkins privilege failed in Trammel: it must pro-
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In In re GrandJuy (Maltano),44 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit recently decided a case involving the Government's attempt to circumvent the privilege against adverse spousal testimony by
promising a limited type of immunity to the nonwitness-spouse. 45 In that
case, the Government sought to compel a witness-wife's testimony before a
grand jury investigating her husband's activities by promising not to use her
testimony against her nontestifying spouse in future proceedings. 46 The
Ma6/iano court refused to find that the wife's privilege was vitiated by the
Government's promise. 4 7 The court noted that "[e]ven if [the wife's] testimony is not used in later proceedings, it seems there is nothing to prevent
this grand jury from considering the [wife's] testimony in deciding whether
to indict." 48 The court held that compelling the wife to testify would strain
the marital relationship and therefore allowed the wife to invoke the privi49
lege against adverse spousal testimony.
mote . . . "sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of justice."
Haney, supra note 27, at 158 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 51).
If such an analysis is correct, the Snoonian decision could be equally justified
today on grounds other than those forwarded by the Snoonian court. It seems that a
court would be justified in holding that the privilege should not be applicable because the rationale for recognizing the privilege is the promotion of domestic harmony and because the danger of engendering marital discord is far less where the
nonwitness-spouse is granted use and derivative-use immunity. Thus, the interest
could be deemed not sufficiently important to "outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice." See 445 U.S. at 51.
44. 633 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980). In Ma'fitano, the witness' husband was one of
the targets of a grand jury investigation relating to the husband's alleged attempt to
secure a loan from the Teamsters Union Pension Fund by paying an illegal kickback.
Id. at 276-77. The witness-wife was subpeonaed and when she appeared before the
grand jury she refused to answer questions on the ground of marital privilege. Id. at
277. The court concluded that the wife's answers would presumably have implicated
her husband. Id.
45. Id. at 279.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 279-80.
48. Id. at 279. The Mafitano court by implication suggested a method by which
the Government might be able to compel the witness' testimony and still respect her
privilege. The court implied that if the Government "sever[ed] the husband's indictment from that of the other defendants to ensure that the grand jury does not use
[the wife's] testimony against her husband," the privilege might thereby be respected.
Id. at 279.
49. Id. at 280. The court noted that
[t]he fact that the grand jury will consider [the wife's] testimony and
possibly indict her husband will put a strain on their marriage. The husband will be subjected to a trial due to an indictment based in part on [the
wife's] testimony. This is no less of a strain on the marriage than if the
[wife] testified at his trial.
Id. Snoonian was distinguished on the basis that the witness' spouse in Snooniazn was
not a target of the grand jury investigation and in fact the Government had granted
use and derivative-use immunity to the nonwitness-spouse. Id. For a discussion of
the immunity granted in Snoont'an, see note 42 and accompanying text supra.
The Ma'fitano court allowed the invocation of the privilege only after focusing
upon whether "the rationale for the privilege does not apply here .. " 633 F.2d at
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Against this background, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit considered whether a witness testifying before a grand jury
may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony where the Government had promised only that the nontestifying spouse, who was conceded
to be a target of investigation, 50 would not be indicted by the specific grand
jury before which the potentially incriminating testimony was sought.5
Judge Rosenn began his analysis by acknowledging that, in fact, what
was being decided by the court was the adequacy of the procedure impliedly
suggested by the Third Circuit in Mailano,52 whereby the marital privilege
might be rendered inapplicable if the Government "sever[ed] the husband's
indictment from that of the other defendants to ensure that the grand jury
does not use [the wife's] testimony against her husband."' 53 He then framed
the issue before the court to be "whether the testimony which the Government is eliciting from the witness amounts to testimony 'against . . .her
spouse in a criminal proceeding.' -54
Judge Rosenrn
Turning to a comparison of the note case and Ma/flano ,'55
noted that "as in Ma/l6ano, the wife's testimony is sought with the understanding that it is likely to implicate her husband."' 56 He further noted that
the only difference between the Government's actions in Ma/fuano and the
Government's actions in the case before him was that in the latter, "the Government seeks to accomplish indirectly what in Ma/fitano we prohibited it
' 57
from doing directly."
The majority opinion then concluded that "the potential disruption to
marital harmony 58 is in no sense diminished because the impact of the
277. The Ma6itano court also held that the privilege applies to spousal testimony
before a grand jury where both husband and wife are alleged to have participated in
the crime under investigation. Id. at 279.
50. 673 F.2d at 689-90.
51. Id. at 690. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
52. 673 F.2d at 692. For a discussion of the procedure suggested inMa/fitano, see
note 48 and accompanying text supra.
53. 673 F.2d at 692 (quoting In re Grand Jury (Malfitano), 633 F.2d at 279).
54. Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury (Malfitano), 633 F.2d at 277).
55. See id.at 692-93.
56. Id. at 692.
57. Id. at 692-93. What the Government was prevented from "doing directly"
was defeating a wife's marital privilege not to testify before a grand jury investigating
her husband, among others, by promising only that the wife's testimony would not be
used in later proceedings against her husband. See notes 46-49 and accompanying
text supra.
Judge Rosenn recognized that at common law the privilege could not be invoked when the testimony was not used in a proceeding in which the nonwitnessspouse was a party. 673 F.2d at 693 n.l 1. The Judge, however, stated that "we do
not believe that the Government should be permitted to bootstrap into two proceedings a prosecution based on a single common scheme for the sole purpose of circumventing the privilege." Id.
58. 673 F.2d at 693. The promotion of marital harmony is the modern justification for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony in the federal courts. See note
16 and accompanying text supra.
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spouse's testimony is delayed."' 59 Therefore, in order to maintain the "integrity of the privilege,"' 60 the court held that "the testimony sought is suffito permit invocation of
ciently adverse to the interests of the absent spouse
61
the privilege against adverse spousal testimony."
In a closing footnote, Judge Rosenn expressed his concern over the
court's "categorical enforcement of the privilege.., which thereby protects
a third party who has no entitlement whatsoever to the benefits of the privilege." 6 2 Prompted by this concern, he suggested a way by which "the district court can respect the witness' privilege . . .without also interfering
with the Government's attempted prosecution of the third party, about
whose activity the wife is being asked to testify."' 63 Judge Rosenn thought
that it would be permissable for the district court to confer use and derivative-use immunity on the witness' spouse which would in turn enable the
64
court to compel the witness' testimony.
Disagreement with the dictum 6 5 contained in that closing footnote
66
served as the sole reason for Judge Sloviter's decision to write separately.
Judge Sloviter noted that "the only issue considered by the district court and
the parties was the scope of the marital privilege" and that therefore Judge
67
Rosenn's footnote was "akin to an advisory opinion."
Judge Adams dissented because he "believe[d] that [the majority's]
59. 673 F.2d at 693.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 692. Judge Rosenn stated that
a wife who asserts the privilege should not be compelled to testify before a
grand jury when her spouse is a target of the same underlying investigation

as the party against whom she is called to testify and her testimony is
sought with the expectation that it may lead to his indictment by a subsequent grand jury.
Id. at 693.
Judge Rosenn defended his decision against the dissent's charge that it represents an unwarranted expansion of the privilege as defined by the Trammel Court. Id.
at 693 n. 11. He listed three reasons for why such a charge was unfounded: 1) although the Trammel Court did note the disfavor with which the privilege has been
viewed, the Court did not abandon the privilege; 2) Malifano demonstrated that the
privilege is a forceful one in the Third Circuit; and 3) the court's decision properly
executed the directive of FED. R. EVID. 501 to apply the rule in the light of reason
and experience. Id. The Judge also disagreed with the dissent's view that the link
between the wife's testimony and her husband's future indictment is too speculative
to allow the wife to invoke the privilege. Id.
62. Id. at 694 n.12.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. See id. Judge Rosenn admits that "this note expresses a personal comment
. . and is not a judgment of the court." Id. at 695 n. 12.
66. Id. at 695 (Sloviter, J., concurring).
67. Id. Judge Sloviter noted that as an advisory opinion, Judge Rosenn's suggestion "suffers from the objections which have been recognized as attending advisory opinions." Id. (citing United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961)). She
also recognized that "neither the government nor the counsel for the witness have
been heard on the practical problems which the court's assumption of such power
might present" and therefore concluded that there was "no good reason to reach to

only.
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holding unduly extend[ed] the marital privilege and contravene[d] the dic'68
tates of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Trammel v. United States."
Judge Adams noted that although Trammel did not abandon the marital
privilege, it did set a strict standard for its application. 69 In the light of such
precedent, the dissent concluded "it would appear difficult to justify any
' 70
expansion in the scope of the rule."
Judge Adams disagreed with the majority's conclusion that "[tihe potential disruption to marital harmony is in no sense diminished because the
impact of the spouse's testimony is delayed. ' 71 He also disagreed with the
majority's opinion that "[it would be anomalous to permit the Government
to do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly." ' 72 He stated the rule to
be that "[t]he privilege cannot be invoked when the testimony is elicited in
another, separate proceeding and is not used in the proceeding in which the
non-witness spouse is a party."' 73 He indicated that Maafilano did not support
the majority's opinion as was claimed, and he distinguished that case on the
basis of the fact that there, "the grand jury before which the /wtlness-spouse/ was
called could indict the non-witness spouse."' 74 Judge Adams' analysis of the
applicability of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony led him to
conclude that, because the witness' husband was not, and could not be, a
target of the particular grand jury investigation before which she had been
address a difficult legal issue in a vacuum, particularly when the conclusion is . . .
far from clear." Id.

68. Id. at 696 (Adams, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 697 (Adams, J. dissenting). For a discussion of the strict standard for
the applicability of the privilege, see note 32 and accompanying text supra.
70. 673 F.2d at 698 (Adams, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (quoting 673 F.2d at 692). Judge Adams thought that although the indirect use of the witness-spouse's testimony could possibly cause stress in the marital
relationship, there is a "qualitative difference in impact between testimony that itself
causes a grand jury to indict the non-witness spouse, and testimony against a third
party, who eventually may testify against the spouse before another grand jury." Id.
Judge Adams stated that it was only in the former situation that one spouse actually
speaks the words that condemn the other and that it is only this direct use of adverse
testimony-not a speculative and attenuated use-which justifies the invocation of
the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. Id.
72. Id. (quoting 673 F.2d at 693 n. 1). Judge Adams noted that the courts have
historically limited the applicability of the marital privilege only to testimony used in
the very proceeding at which the nonwitness-spouse is indicted or tried. Id. For a
discussion of this limitation, see note 18 and accompanying text supra. Thus, Judge
Adams recognized that, at common law, such an "anomalous" result was both accepted and necessary to reconcile the "tension between the 'right to every man's evidence' and society's interest in excluding adverse testimony by one spouse against the
other." 673 F.2d at 698 (Adams, J., dissenting) (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. at 50-51).

73. 673 F.2d at 698-99 (Adams, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Burks,
470 F.2d 432, 435-36 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (privilege not applicable because husband's legal interests were "in no way at stake in this case"); United States v. Fields,
458 F.2d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973)) (testimony of
spouse of one defendant sought by co-defendant; proper procedure is to grant severance and then permit the witness to testify for the co-defendant).

74. Id. at 699 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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75
subpoenaed to testify, the witness could not invoke the privilege.
Reviewing the court's opinion, it is submitted that the majority was
doubtlessly correct in recognizing that in the case before it, the Government
was seeking to accomplish indirectly what the Third Circuit in Mafitano had
already prohibited it from doing directly.7 6 Apparently the majority found
this consideration to be significant enough to carry the case. The dissent,
however, correctly noted that another equally important consideration was
the historical limitation placed on the applicability of the privilege. 77 Although the majority recognized that the privilege was confined at common
law "to only such testimony as is adverse to the other spouse's legal interests
in the very case under consideration," 78 it failed to attempt to reconcile its
decision with that common law rule which is not without support in federal
case law. 79 The majority ignored this consideration when it framed the issue
to be "whether the testimony which the Government is eliciting from the
witness amounts to testimony 'against . . .her spouse in a criminal proceeding.' "80 The majority again ignored this consideration when it held that,
given the facts of the case, "the testimony sought is sutciently adverse to the
interests of the absent spouse to permit invocation of the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony."81

75. Id. at 700 (Adams, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 693 n. 11. For a discussion of what the Government was seeking to
accomplish indirectly, see notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
77. See 673 F.2d at 698-99 (Adams, J., dissenting). See also notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra.
78. See 673 F.2d at 691.
79. See note 19 supra.

80. 673 F.2d at 692 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Grand Jury (Malfitano),
633 F.2d at 277). The use of the phrase "a criminal proceeding" used in this context
implies a meaning equivalent to "any criminal proceeding."
It should be noted that although this is in fact a quotation from Ma/ftano, it does
not represent the holding of Mafitano and is therefore used by this court somewhat
out of context. The majority implies, through its use of the Mal4/tano quote, that it is
using the test used by the Malfitano court to determine whether the privilege is applicable. In fact, the quote was used by the Maoitano court as an introductory statement
to its discussion of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. See 633 F.2d at
277. It is incorrect to imply that the Maoflano court held that the test for the applicability of the privilege is whether the testimony might adversely affect the witness'
spouse in any proceeding because in Ma4itano the witness' spouse was a target of the
very grand jury proceeding before which the witness was subpoenaed to testify. Id.
See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
81. 673 F.2d at 692 (emphasis added). The adverseness of the testimony is not
the only factor to be considered in determining the applicability of the privilege. See
notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. The witness' spouse must also have some
legal interest in the proceeding in which testimony is sought. See In re Snoonian, 502
F.2d at 112. The Snoonian court acknowledged that the test for the applicability of
the privilege is two-part:
There is a dearth of precedent as to how closely the supposedly endangered
spouse must be the "target" of the grand jury's investigation before the
privilege may be invoked. .

.

. It is also unclear how obviously the ques-

tions asked one spouse must adversely affect the interests of the other spouse
to warrant the former's refusal to respond.
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The dissent, therefore, appears to be justified in critizing the majority
for "extend[ing] the marital privilege." ' 82 This, however, does not in and of
itself render the majority's conclusion erroneous. It is submitted that the
bottom line is that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 dictates that "the privilege
of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted . . . in the lght of reason and experience. "83 The majority stated that it "believe[d] that [its] decision properly execute[d] that directive." '8 4 It is submitted that one would be hard pressed to claim that the
"light of reason and experience" did not shine on the majority when it decided as it did. Admittedly the dissent's opinion is well supported in the law
and if precedent were the only consideration, it might be the better opinion.
However, the majority's decision, in its maintenance of the "integrity of the
privilege" 85 and in its adherence to the commonsensical notion that it would
be unjust to allow the Government to do indirectly what it could not do
directly, seems to more closely follow the direction of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to apply "reason and experience."
Perhaps the majority's opinion might be less offensive to those preferring the dissent's reasoning if Judge Rosenn viewed the decision as not "extending the marital privilege," but instead as broadening the interpretation
of when a nontestifying spouse has a legal interest in the case where the
witness-spouse is sought to testify. 86 In this light, the rule which confines the
privilege to only such testimony as is adverse to the other spouse's legal interest in the very case under consideration remains preserved.
Although the majority's decision is a justifiable one,8 7 it is submitted
that it does, as the dissent charged, breathe some additional life into the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony. At the very least, the privilege is
now recognized in one instance where the nontestifying spouse does not have
Id. (citations omitted) The quote recognizes the "same proceeding" requirement,
distinct from the "adverseness" requirement. See id.
82. 673 F.2d at 694 (Adams, J., dissenting). It does seem that the majority has
made an exception to the rule that the privilege can be invoked only when the testimony is adverse to the other spouse's legal interests in the very case in which testimony is sought. See id. To the extent that making such an exception expands the
utilization of the privilege, the dissent has correctly characterized what the majority
has done. Perhaps, however, it is more helpful to view the majority's holding as
creating an exception to the old rule rather than to view it as looking towards a new
rule recognizing a more encompassing marital privilege.
83. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Rule 501, see
note 22 and accompanying text supra.
84. See 673 F.2d at 693 n.11.
85. See id. at 693. See also note 60 and accompanying text supra. It should be
observed that the Trammel Court did recognize the privilege against adverse spousal
testimony to be a viable principle in the federal courts. See 445 U.S. at 46. See also
note 28 and accompanying text supra. Therefore it is understandable that the court
felt obligated to preserve a living and forceful marital privilege instead of one which
could easily be sidestepped by the Government once it learned the proper procedural
loopholes.
86. See note 88 and accompanying text infra.
87. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
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a direct 88 legal interest in the proceeding at which testimony is sought. It is
unclear as to how serious of an inroad has been made into the rule that
confines the privilege to testimony which is adverse to the other spouse's
legal interest in the very case under consideration. Given the long-standing
89
common law recognition of the rule, it is unlikely that the court intended a
substantial alteration of the rule. Perhaps the inroad is properly to be limited to those instances where the Government has attempted to do indirectly
90
what it "has been forbidden to do directly."
One might be tempted to criticize the court for creating some uncertainty where once it was thought there existed a seemingly well-defined
rule. 9 1 Yet, if certainty were of paramount importance, Federal Rule of Evi92
The federal rules of privilege were
dence 501 would not read as it does.
intended "to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privi93
Therelege on a case-by-case basis and to leave the door open to change."
fore, although the court's decision heightens the uncertainty surrounding the
privilege, it seems to be compatible with Rule 501.

Gaty S Lewis
88. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that the nontestifying spouse may have an indirecl interest in the proceeding which justifies his spouse's
invocation of the marital privilege. Id.
89. See 673 F.2d at 691. See also notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. The fact that the Third Circuit so
characterized the government's conduct certainly was a factor in the court's decision.
Id.
91. See note 18 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this rule.
92. See FED. R. EVID. 501. See also note 22 and accompanying text supra for a
discussion of Rule 501.
93. See 445 U.S. at 47. See also note 22 supra.
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